Deep Sea MiningDSM is not investible as a pure-profit business
Stress-tested across ten thousand simulations, the proponent’s numbers return a loss at the median — before environmental or social costs.
The iron law of megaprojects
Less than 10% of all megaprojects come in on time and on budget — frontier projects like deep-sea mining are particularly risky. Here are some cost overruns.
Kashagan oilfield+450%
2004–16 · $10bn → $55bn
Boston “Big Dig”+421%
1991–2007 · $2.8bn → $14.6bn
California High-Speed Rail+282%
2008– · $33bn → $126bn
HS2 (UK)+205%
2012– · £33bn → £100bn
Channel Tunnel+80%
1988–94 · £2.6bn → £4.7bn
Deep-sea mining+76%
??? · median overrun modelled
Gorgon LNG+46%
2009–16 · $37bn → $54bn
How overruns play in the project
$366bn of revenue collapses to a negative value today — stage by stage, across 10,000 simulations.
Some major operational challenges
- Complex engineering to lift millions of tons from 5,000 metres down — five times more pressure than on the surface of Venus.
- Data on the resource base are at least ten times weaker than at a standard mine on land.
- Uninsurable, and therefore cut off from mainstream project finance.
- A widespread industry boycott and government moratorium — the market for the product is not assured.
Deep-sea mining as an asset class
The commercial case doesn’t clear on its own terms.
No exploitation licence should be issued without compliance-grade financial disclosure and thin capitalisation provisions.
Koinon Consulting · June 2026 · Investment proposition 1 of 3